Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy

Welcome:
Guest

Advances in Strategic Management

ISSN: 0742-3322
Series editor(s): Professor Brian Silverman

Subject Area: Strategy

Content: Series Volumes | Current Volume RSS

Options: To add Favourites and Table of Contents Alerts please take a Emerald profile

Document Information:
Title:	Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy
Author(s):	Guy L.F. Holburn, Richard G. Vanden Bergh
Volume:	19 Editor(s): Paul Ingram and Brian S. Silverman ISBN: 978-0-7623-0903-0 eISBN: 978-1-84950-164-4
Citation:	Guy L.F. Holburn, Richard G. Vanden Bergh (2002), Policy and process: A game-theoretic framework for the design of non-market strategy, in Paul Ingram and Brian S. Silverman (ed.) The New Institutionalism in Strategic Management (Advances in Strategic Management, Volume 19), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.33-66
DOI:	10.1016/S0742-3322(02)19002-4 (Permanent URL)
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Article type:	Full length article
Abstract:	We draw on the Positive Political Theory literature to develop insights into how firms decide whether to lobby legislatures or agencies in order to gain favorable policy outcomes. We present a simple structural model of the interaction among a firm, a legislature, an executive, a court and an agency to illustrate how, even if the agency has responsibility for implementing public policy, the firm will, under the right conditions, lobby the legislature instead to bring about a change in policy. Accordingly, we contribute to the existing non-market strategy literature by incorporating institutional players other than the legislature into the analysis, and by addressing the question of how firms allocate lobbying resources across the different branches of government.