Board monitoring and access to debt financing

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Advances in Financial Economics

ISSN: 1569-3732
Series editor(s): Professor Kose John, Professor Anil Makhija, Professor Stephen P. Ferris

Subject Area: Economics

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Document Information:
Title:	Board monitoring and access to debt financing
Author(s):	Zhenyu Wu, Jess Chua
Volume:	13 Editor(s): Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija ISBN: 978-1-84855-536-5 eISBN: 978-1-84855-537-2
Citation:	Zhenyu Wu, Jess Chua (2009), Board monitoring and access to debt financing, in Mark Hirschey, Kose John, Anil K. Makhija (ed.) Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Advances in Financial Economics, Volume 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.119-137
DOI:	10.1108/S1569-3732(2009)0000013007 (Permanent URL)
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Article type:	Chapter Item
Abstract:	Board monitoring should affect a firm's access to debt financing because it improves firm performance and the board is ultimately responsible for the firm's debt. In this study, we show empirically that access to debt financing indeed benefits in two ways from board monitoring: directly from the monitoring and indirectly from improvement in performance. The methodological challenge is in separating the two effects from each other and from those of other drivers of debt financing.