A comparison of policies to reduce pesticide poisoning combining economic and toxicological data

David Sunding; Joshua Zivin

doi:10.1016/S1569-3740(02)04013-0

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Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources

ISSN: 1569-3740
Series editor(s): Professor Richard Howarth

Subject Area: Economics

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A comparison of policies to reduce pesticide poisoning combining economic and toxicological data

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Title:	A comparison of policies to reduce pesticide poisoning combining economic and toxicological data
Author(s):	David Sunding, Joshua Zivin
Volume:	4 Editor(s): Darwin C. Hall, L. Joe Moffitt ISBN: 978-0-76230-850-7 eISBN: 978-1-84950-138-5
Citation:	David Sunding, Joshua Zivin (2002), A comparison of policies to reduce pesticide poisoning combining economic and toxicological data, in Darwin C. Hall, L. Joe Moffitt (ed.) Economics of Pesticides, Sustainable Food Production, and Organic Food Markets (Advances in the Economics of Environmental Resources, Volume 4), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.259-279
DOI:	10.1016/S1569-3740(02)04013-0 (Permanent URL)
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Article type:	Full length article
Abstract:	The paper combines health risk generation and economic models to compare the efficiency of the two main types of policies to reduce worker injury from toxic substances: occupational safety regulations designed to limit exposure to toxic substances and taxes and bans that are intended to reduce contamination, or total use of the product. The model is developed with reference to pesticide poisoning of farm workers. General conditions for the relative efficiency of policies are derived. Empirical results indicate that protective clothing requirements achieve given reductions in poisonings with about half the cost of a pesticide tax. Implications of the model for regulating other types of worker injury from hazardous inputs are presented.