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Insider trading

Michael J. Laird (Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin‐Whitewater, Whitewater, WI, USA.)

Managerial Auditing Journal

ISSN: 0268-6902

Article publication date: 1 July 1995

2182

Abstract

Hypothesizes that the whole concept of “insider trading” is being overplayed. Is the “average” share purchaser disadvantaged? After analysing the case law, the legislation (and proposed legislation) and the financial theory of efficient markets, concludes that insider trading exists only in the strong market hypothesis and only when a fiduciary duty is established. This is not a zero‐sum game in which one wins and the other loses – everyone can win, some maybe more than others. No one is being cheated; there is no way to establish parity of information nor would most investors know how to use it if it could be established. It appears that we could be embarking on a counter‐productive campaign that will punish those who achieve what their profession requires, all the necessary information on which to make an investment decision; particularly if they achieve it first.

Keywords

Citation

Laird, M.J. (1995), "Insider trading", Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 16-26. https://doi.org/10.1108/02686909510087946

Publisher

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MCB UP Ltd

Copyright © 1995, MCB UP Limited

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