Related party transactions: too close for (shareholders') comfort
Catherine M. Dalton
(David H. Jacobs Chair of Strategic Management, Editor of Business Horizons, and Research Director of the Institute for Corporate Governance in the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.)
Dan R. Dalton
(Dean Emeritus, Harold A. Poling Chair of Strategic Management, and Director of the Institute for Corporate Governance in the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.)
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Abstract
Purpose
Looks at increasing number of related party transactions despite regulatory scrutiny.
Findings
Although related party transactions per se are not illegal or underhanded, they have the potential to raise red flags more readily than other transactions.
Practical implications
Provides executives with information on related party transactions and how to avoid impropriety.
Originality/value
Of particular value to CEOs and other board members
Keywords
Citation
Dalton, C.M. and Dalton, D.R. (2006), "Related party transactions: too close for (shareholders') comfort", Journal of Business Strategy, Vol. 27 No. 6, pp. 5-7. https://doi.org/10.1108/02756660610710283
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2006, Emerald Group Publishing Limited