How do graduates transmit desired signals in the workplace?

Abstract

There is a paucity of evidence to explain exactly why those who are highly‐qualified are paid above average wages. Although both human capital and signalling/screening theories seek to explain this trend, conclusive empirical evidence has proved elusive. This longitudinal study looks at post‐entry signalling made by a number of graduates embarking on a career within the internal labour market of a large (UK) petrochemical company. People who used their own time to study for membership of a professional body while simultaneously doing their full‐time job, obtained significantly more promotion than their contemporaries. The UK Government’s attempts to encourage workers to use the NVQ route to qualification were largely ignored as a signalling device. The results of the study were more consistent with screening theory than the human capital model, but more research needs to be done.

Citation

Monk, D. (1998), "How do graduates transmit desired signals in the workplace?", Journal of European Industrial Training, Vol. 22 No. 9, pp. 362-366. https://doi.org/10.1108/03090599810241009