The House's policy reversal on gun control: Agency discretion and the durability of interest group deals

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to examine why a legislature would repeal an interest group deal. Design/methodology/approach–This paper provides a case study of the House of Representatives’ roll call reversal on the Brady Bill. The House voted against the Brady Bill in 1988 giving a victory to pro‐gun interest groups. It then reversed itself and voted for the Brady Bill in 1993.

Findings

This paper finds that changes in the democratic party leadership may be responsible for the House's policy reversal on gun control.

Practical implications

These findings suggest that in a principal–agent relationship, the agent has some discretion. In this case, the principal (elected members of a party in the US House) hires an agent (its leadership) to organize their teamwork to produce legislative output. The leadership has some discretion in making interest group deals.

Originality/value

The paper shows how changes in leadership reduce the durability of interest group deals.

Citation

McGarrity, J.P. (2007), "The House's policy reversal on gun control: Agency discretion and the durability of interest group deals", Humanomics, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 137-152. https://doi.org/10.1108/08288660710779371