The House's policy reversal on gun control: Agency discretion and the durability of interest group deals
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine why a legislature would repeal an interest group deal. Design/methodology/approach–This paper provides a case study of the House of Representatives’ roll call reversal on the Brady Bill. The House voted against the Brady Bill in 1988 giving a victory to pro‐gun interest groups. It then reversed itself and voted for the Brady Bill in 1993.
Findings
This paper finds that changes in the democratic party leadership may be responsible for the House's policy reversal on gun control.
Practical implications
These findings suggest that in a principal–agent relationship, the agent has some discretion. In this case, the principal (elected members of a party in the US House) hires an agent (its leadership) to organize their teamwork to produce legislative output. The leadership has some discretion in making interest group deals.
Originality/value
The paper shows how changes in leadership reduce the durability of interest group deals.
Keywords
Citation
McGarrity, J.P. (2007), "The House's policy reversal on gun control: Agency discretion and the durability of interest group deals", Humanomics, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 137-152. https://doi.org/10.1108/08288660710779371
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2007, Emerald Group Publishing Limited