Qui a peur de la Corée du nord? (Who's Afraid of North Korea?)

Citation

Richardson, J. (2008), "Qui a peur de la Corée du nord? (Who's Afraid of North Korea?)", Foresight, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 66-68. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636680810918531

This is the story of the enduring aftermath of the war of 1950‐1953 that probably took 2.5 million lives on both sides (China included). Nearly 60 years later, the war continues in theory because no peace treaty has been signed, a cold conflict that has become an exercise in unremitting politico‐psychological warfare.

Since the truce was signed in 1953, both North Korea and the Republic of (South) Korea/US coalition have misinterpreted the other's capabilities, misjudged the other's intentions. The year 2008 is but another in a prolonged face‐off, with at least six countries still pondering how long and how fully the checkmate might last. As recently as February 2007 the two Koreas, China, the US, Japan and Russia agreed in Beijing that the North (or Democratic People's Republic of Korea) would freeze its nuclear‐weapon effort, leading to a complete and verifiable halt of all nuclear‐based arms.

The Republic of Korea is neither a nuclear power nor one equipped with long‐range missile potential. In the north, a prime motive behind the repeated delays by Kim Jong‐Il is to obtain diplomatic recognition from a hesitant US, all the while bargaining for what it can eke out for its food‐short economy in the form of non‐nuclear energy and other benefits from the Americans and Japanese. As of the preparation of this review, total cessation of a nuclear‐war potential is still awaited.

Author Claude Helper, from an earlier unofficial position as a professional in the field of foreign aid, knows the region – and especially North Korea – well. He has documented accurately the gradual acquisition by that country of a nuclear‐weapon asset and a limited delivery system by missile, together with a pervasive sense of hopelessness surrounding the resolution of the two‐Koreas problem. It will soon be 60 years since the North invaded the South in June 1950. The author has recounted faithfully the five major rounds of “denuclearizing” discussions, with China involved, since 2003 (pp. 222‐256); these led to the “Beijing Deal” of February 2007, committing North Korea to cease uranium enrichment for military ends. This is, of course, history.

The portions of his book of most interest to readers of foresight begin with the changed attitude of a previously inert President George W. Bush, as of 2006, in dealing with the North Koreans as an entity in themselves (pp. 315) – although the Americans had previously classified North Korea as part of an “axis of evil”. By that time, too, Libya had renounced a policy of acquiring or using nuclear arms and Ukraine had done much the same.

Non‐proliferation had already come to life among most of the nuclear powers – one admittedly not adhered to by all members of the “nuclear club” – a policy known as complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament (CVID). Non‐proliferation became a realistic objective. Towards this goal, North Korea finally agreed to reveal all details of its nuclear holdings by the end of 2007. This has not yet been done, perhaps because of the same suspicions that the Kim regime has harbored all along: the great powers cannot be trusted to honor and respect North Korea as an autonomous power in itself.

The north: small nation, huge military establishment

Your reviewer has published a number of game‐theory analyses of North Korea's nuclear posture since 1993 and sympathizes with author Claude Helper's seeming frustration in anticipating North Korea's return to a less renegade status than it has shown over the past decades. Author Helper notes, in trying to project what North Korea's future strategy might be, Kim Jong‐Il's continuing policy of The Military First (Songun) formalized since 1999 and strengthened as recently as in 2007 by a defense allocation of one‐sixth the national budget and the naming of another 1,200 general officers. The author terms these measures hedges against a possible reversal of Kim's fortunes by his senior military men.

What the Kim regime – and that of his father Kim Il‐Sung before him – wants most, projects the author is “a long‐term strategic relationship with the US. This has nothing to do with ideology or a political philosophy” (p. 325). Fearful, in fact, of future threats to their security by China and Japan, Kim & Co. would welcome – without saying so, especially for internal consumption – is the retention of American forces in the south.

The author reminds that, as early as June 2000, Kim Jong‐Il avowed as much to visiting South Korean President Kim Dae‐Jung. Such a stand clearly contradicts the North's propaganda bombast for the benefit of the outside world, too. Durxing an August 2007 meeting between North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui‐Chun and his opposite number from the South Song Min‐Soon, Pak told Song that the North “will undertake every effort necessary for denuclearization and the normalization of relations with the US” (p. 337), with a proviso. This is that delivery be made of two light‐water reactors promised in Geneva in 1994. Without advancing scenarios (who could?), the author dares say that “one can hope that the North‐Korean nuclear and ballistic problems will be resolved” (p. 327): a self‐eroding dynamic game, n other words, if ever there was one (as late as March 2008 the North's Foreign Minister announced further missile testing and threatened delayed denuclearization while insisting that his country had never supplied others with nuclear assistance).

But all games come to an end, one way or another. Claude Helper sees among the “foreseeable solutions” the part that could be played by “a multi‐nation regional organization for cooperation and security in Asia, backed by the UN, leading incontestably to a peace treaty between the US and North Korea, a pact to replace the armistice agreement of 1953)”. Such a move would also help integrate the North within the regional economic system and allow it to undertake serious economic reforms within the framework of economic globalization” (pp. 333‐334). The obstacle here, however, is twofold: the only such entity is the ASEAN group, and North Korea is not a member. Author Helper's final words are, in English, “wait and see … ”

This volume is a detailed, informative and fast‐paced piece of history cum literature of anticipation in a language other than English. Invaluable to researchers in political science, international relations and the practical arts of both risk aversion and negotiation, it is unfortunate (for reader and author) that the publisher failed to include a much‐needed index.