De la France de toujours à l'Europe de demain (France from Earliest Times to Tomorrow's Europe)

Citation

Richardson, J. (2009), "De la France de toujours à l'Europe de demain (France from Earliest Times to Tomorrow's Europe)", Foresight, Vol. 11 No. 1, pp. 94-95. https://doi.org/10.1108/14636680910936468

At a moment in the evolution of conflicts, when both the European Union and France are groping their way towards new defence policies, word from a military intellectual is an oddity among the flood of political forecasts on the subject. A recently retired brigadier of the French army, engineer Jacques Favin Lévêque, raises a number of questions currently being asked by both interested commentators and the civil authorities to whom the military normally respond and react:

1. 1.

   What does globalization really mean for Europe?

2. 2.

   What does Europe risk losing from globalization?

3. 3.

   What has Europe to gain?

4. 4.

   Can Europe maintain, amid this gigantic upheaval, influence relative to its merits and talents?

5. 5.

   If so, how to proceed?

In a grouped response to these five questions, General Favin Lévêque cites the former German foreign minister (and, before that, an inveterately militant “green”), Joschka Fischer:

Beyond Europe's frontiers, the world is changing rapidly; the world will not await Europe, mired in a painful process of introspection. The alternatives are clear: either Europe falls in step, or it accepts to lag behind (p. 133).

Favin, a dedicated Europeanist, develops his alternative further. He believes strongly that the future of the Union depends on a strong adherence to the ideals of the original Coal and Steel Community of a half‐century ago as well as protection of the Old World's Interests”: industrial and commercial, cultural, societal, and those of defence. Defence, he adds, encompasses the menaces common to all:

• •

  international terrorism;

• •

  proliferation of arms of mass destruction;

• •

  drug traffic; and

• •

  other organized crime.

Added to these threats are, of course, those endangering human rights, “values which, despite their chaotic history, created the civilization” proper to Europe itself. But, adds the military man, the worse threat to the future of Europe comes from within Europe itself – when The Netherlands and France voted against approval of the draft Constitution for Europe. (The negative results of the Irish referendum would have to await another few years, just after publication of this book.)

These are perceptive insights from an officer who once commanded 13 Engineer Regiment (organic to 1 Armoured Division) of the French land forces and was later assigned to the main weapons directorate of the army (Délégation générale pour l'armenent) – a staff body responsible for translating French ground‐force doctrine into the technical means for future action in the field. The reader assumes that it was this experience, combined with a later posting in military industry, that spurred Favin Lévêque to recommend that the EU improve its capacities in five domains:

1. 1.

   strategic‐intelligence, communication, and satellite‐positioning systems;

2. 2.

   network‐centric warfare: digitized battle‐space and integrated defence‐systems (drones included);

3. 3.

   aerial and maritime strategic‐transport systems;

4. 4.

   performance‐adaptable combat and logistic systems for high‐intensity and prolonged conflict; and

5. 5.

   and (Why not? he asks) a European anti‐missile system complementing that meant to protect the United States (p. 150).

D'une chose à l'autre

With the assumption by France of the European Union's presidency in July 2008, this year could be the last time that France holds the rotating presidency if the European Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) can take effect in 2009. Let's see, then, what has happened after the appearance of the book reviewed here.

In June 2008 President Nicolas Sarkozy presented a white paper on defence to cover the period through 2023. One of the main proposals of this document is that the magic of advanced weapons should be made secondary to better preparation of both troops and their support. As reported in the daily newspaper Le Monde in its edition for 17 June, Sarkozy declared a series of functional initiatives imperative for the preservation of his country's defensive posture:

• •

  a reintegration of French staff within NATO's high command (withdrawn by Charles de Gaulle in 1966);

• •

  creation of a French military base at Abu Dhabi;

• •

  restructuring of France's agreements and presence of forces in (mainly West) Africa;

• •

  reinforcement of French deployments in Afghanistan;

• •

  a re‐organization of French defence installations on home territory, with a reduction‐in‐force of 54,000 men and women;

• •

  a review of the nation's space policy; and

• •

  rethinking the whole of the military's knowledge and anticipation activities.

The last item is of special interest in an era of the “knowledge economy” in the industrialized democracies and BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Sarkozy's specific reference is to the intelligence functions of France's armed services. His white paper contrasts French foreign‐intelligence capacity – exclusive of customs and excise – of 9,500 appointments (of which 1,680 are military) with those of the UK (13,400 and 4,200) and Germany (16,500 and 3,750). The French intelligence budget this year of €744 million contrasts feebly, for example, with that of €3,31 billion for Britain.

In the final sections of his book, Favin Lévêque urges that “Europe remain that of large‐scale projects. Her culture should concentrate on major achievements: Ariane (space vehicles), Airbus, the TGV (high‐speed trains), the Millau viaduct (in France), the Hughens space probe, and later Galileo (global positioning system) or ITER (nuclear‐fusion generation), objectives serving as the very proof of (Europe's) existence and creativity” (p. 160).

And this reviewer asks: Why not?