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Managerial Ownership Structure and Earnings Management

Chi‐Yih Yang (Minghsin University of Science and Technology, Taiwan and Xi’an Jiaotong‐Liverpool University, China)
Hung‐Neng Lai (National Central University, Taiwan)
Boon Leing Tan (Xi’an Jiaotong‐Liverpool University, China)

Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting

ISSN: 1985-2517

Article publication date: 6 January 2008

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Abstract

This study examines the relation between managerial ownership structure and earnings management. Unlike previous research which treats insiders as a homogeneous group, we further classify insiders into executives, outside directors, and blockholders to conduct an in‐depth study. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using the modified Jones model. For a large sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period 1997 and 2004, we find that discretionary accruals first increase and then decrease with executive ownership, forming an inverted U‐shaped relationship. However, discretionary accruals are positively affected by director ownership and blockholder ownership. The results suggest that equity stake owned by top officers of a firm should be encouraged in order to reduce agency cost, thus enhancing information content of earnings.

Keywords

Citation

Yang, C., Lai, H. and Leing Tan, B. (2008), "Managerial Ownership Structure and Earnings Management", Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 35-53. https://doi.org/10.1108/19852510880000634

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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