Research on the heterogeneity of executives’ nonsalary incentives on corporate green technology innovation
Abstract
Purpose
Green technology innovation is the organic combination of green development and innovation driven. It is also a powerful guarantee for shaping sustainable competitive advantages of manufacturing enterprises. To explore what kind of executive incentive contracts can truly stimulate green technology innovation, this study aims to distinguish the equity incentive and reputation incentive, upon their contractual elements characteristics and green governance effects, and then put forward suggestions for green technology innovation accordingly.
Design/methodology/approach
This study establishes an evaluation model and uses empirical methods to test. Concretely, using data from A-share listed manufacturing companies for the period from 2007 to 2020, this study compares and analyzes the impact of equity and reputation incentive on green technology innovation and explores the relationship between internal green business behavior and external green in depth.
Findings
This study finds that reputation incentives focus on long-term and non-utilitarian orientation, which can promote green technology innovation in enterprises. While equity incentives, linked to performance indicators, have a inhibitory effect on green technology innovation. Internal and external institutional factors such as energy conservation measures, the “three wastes” management system, and environmental recognition play the regulatory role in the relationship between incentive contracts and green technology innovation.
Originality/value
Those findings validate and expand the efficient contracting hypothesis and the rent extraction hypothesis from the perspective of green technology innovation and provide useful implications for the design of green governance systems in manufacturing enterprises.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant numbers 72372090 and 71872103). The detailed information of the fund is as follows: Good governance only to be achieved by long oriented: Research on the sharing mechanism and effect of managerial long term (grant number 72372090) “Sacrifice Profit to Duty” or “Tired of fame”? Research on the Dual Governance Effects of Executive Reputation and Optimized Path in Chinese Context (grant number 71872103).
Citation
Xu, N., Zhang, D., Li, Y. and Bai, Y. (2024), "Research on the heterogeneity of executives’ nonsalary incentives on corporate green technology innovation", Chinese Management Studies, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. https://doi.org/10.1108/CMS-03-2023-0130
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2024, Emerald Publishing Limited