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The coordination mechanism of a risk-averse green supply chain

Yuhong Wang (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, China)
Xiaoqi Sheng (College of Business and Economics, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia)
Yudie Xie (School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi, China)

Chinese Management Studies

ISSN: 1750-614X

Article publication date: 20 February 2023

Issue publication date: 2 January 2024

301

Abstract

Purpose

This study aims to establish a centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model based on factors of risk aversion of supply chain members and product greenness. The research aims to study whether the introduction of the “cost + risk sharing” contract affects coordination of this type of green supply by calculating the optimal decision of each mode.

Design/methodology/approach

This research designs a supply chain model under centralized and decentralized decision-making. This model uses the Stackelberg game to calculate the optimal decision under decentralized decision-making to evaluate the effect of a green supply chain and then analyze the “cost + risk sharing” contract and the degree of coordination of the supply chain. A sensitivity analysis is conducted on the centralized mode for the impact of variables on the supply chain.

Findings

This research finds a double marginalization effect in decentralized decision-making, and the risk aversion coefficient plays a decisive role in the utility of supply chain members. The specific range of risk- and cost-sharing factors allows supply chain members to achieve Pareto improvements and provides decision-making based on the corresponding management strategies according to each other’s risk preference degree.

Research limitations/implications

The influence of each variable on the green supply chain in the centralized mode is studied by MATLAB numerical simulation. It provides reference for green supply chain members to formulate corresponding management strategies according to each other's risk preference degree.

Originality/value

This research innovatively considers manufacturers and retailers to explore the market demand for product greenness. It introduces a novel “cost + risk sharing” contract to coordinate the green supply chain.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank editors and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions. The research reported in this paper was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71871106) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Nos. JUSRP1809ZD; 2019JDZD06; JUSRP321016). The work was also sponsored by the Key Project of Philosophy and Social Science Research in Universities of Jiangsu Province (No. 2018SJZDI051); the Major Projects of Philosophy and Social Science Research of Guizhou Province (No. 21GZZB32); Project of Chinese Academic Degrees and Graduate Education (2020ZDB2); the “14th Five-Year” Higher Education Scientific Research Planning Project of Jiangsu Higher Education Association (ZDGG02).

Citation

Wang, Y., Sheng, X. and Xie, Y. (2024), "The coordination mechanism of a risk-averse green supply chain", Chinese Management Studies, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 174-195. https://doi.org/10.1108/CMS-10-2021-0454

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Emerald Publishing Limited

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