SOX 404 and debt contracting value of accounting information

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to investigate whether the Section 404 of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX 404) changed the way banks use accounting information to price corporate loans.

Design/methodology/approach

The study uses a sample of 1,173 US-listed firms that issued syndicated loans both before and after their compliance with SOX 404 to analyze the changes in loan spread’s sensitivity to some key accounting metrics such as ROA, interest coverage, leverage and net worth.

Findings

The study finds that the interest spread’s sensitivity to key accounting metrics, most noticeably for ROA, declined following the borrower’s compliance with the requirements of SOX 404. The decline was not explainable by borrowers that disclosed internal control weaknesses but concentrated among borrowers suspected of real earnings management (REM).

Originality/value

By examining the effects of SOX 404 on banks’ pricing process, this study augments the literature on SOX’s economic consequences. The findings suggest that lenders perceive little new information from SOX 404 disclosures of internal control deficiencies and are cautious about the accounting information provided by REM borrowers. It also extends the research on the use of accounting information in debt contracting. By examining loan interest’s sensitivity to accounting metrics, it broadens the concept of debt contracting value of accounting information to include accounting’s usefulness for assessing credit risk at loan inception.

Citation

Li, S. (2018), "SOX 404 and debt contracting value of accounting information", International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 384-412. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJAIM-03-2017-0042