Earnings management and evolution of the banking regulation: The case of Tunisian banks following the IMF recommendations

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the earnings management practices of Tunisian banks after the publication of the first International Monetary Fund (IMF) report (2002) over the period 1998-2007.

Design/methodology/approach

The study relies on a mixed model that combines both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. First of all, we use the quantitative method to measure the discretionary loan loss provisions based on the model of Cornett et al. (2009), and then we validate the quantitative findings by using the interview approach.

Findings

Since 2005, Tunisian banks have resorted less and less to accounting earnings management through the loan loss provisions, but conversely, real earnings management has been revealed instead by the sale of investment securities and the use of debt collection agencies. Despite the IMF recommendations, Tunisian banks continue to manage their earnings by changing only their strategies.

Practical implications

The findings of this study show that the regulation cannot avoid earnings management. Even if the regulation limits the discretion of the manager, the latter finds new alternatives to manipulate the earnings.

Originality/value

This is the first study that analyses the impact of the IMF recommendations on earnings management in an emerging economy.

Citation

Elleuch, S.H. and Taktak, N.B. (2015), "Earnings management and evolution of the banking regulation: The case of Tunisian banks following the IMF recommendations", Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 150-169. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAEE-12-2011-0057