Markets for rules: the promise and peril of blockchain distributed governance
Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy
ISSN: 2045-2101
Article publication date: 24 September 2019
Issue publication date: 19 June 2020
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible contributions of blockchain technology to creating new governance structures that facilitate social cooperation.
Design/methodology/approach
Conceptual analysis with key ideas in new institutional economics and political theory is used in this paper.
Findings
Blockchain technology provides a new tool through which political entrepreneurs can credibly alienate some of their power within a system of rules that they have established.
Originality/value
This paper links discussion of blockchain entrepreneurship in commercial markets to research into private governance.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was generously awarded the 2018 Hayek Essay Prize by the Mont Pelerin Society. The first draft of this paper was written as part of a fellowship at the Classical Liberal Institute, New York University School of Law. Many thanks are due to Shruti Rajagopalan, Abigail Devereux, Malte Dold, Charles Delmotte and Jake Brukhman.
Citation
Cowen, N. (2020), "Markets for rules: the promise and peril of blockchain distributed governance", Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 213-226. https://doi.org/10.1108/JEPP-03-2019-0013
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited