To read this content please select one of the options below:

Shareholder litigation risk and real earnings management: a causal inference

Qunfeng Liao (Department of Accounting and Finance, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan, USA)
Bo Ouyang (Penn State University, Great Valley School of Graduate Professional Studies, Malvern, Pennsylvania, USA)

Review of Accounting and Finance

ISSN: 1475-7702

Article publication date: 9 October 2019

Issue publication date: 28 November 2019

490

Abstract

Purpose

The authors study how shareholder litigation risk impacts a firm’s decision of real earnings management (REM). This paper aims to shed light on how shareholder litigation risk impacts REM. The authors further explore how the intensifying effect varies systematically conditioning on the degree of information asymmetry and the strength of internal corporate governance.

Design/methodology/approach

In this study, the authors use the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court ruling as a quasi-experiment that reduces shareholder litigation risk to address endogeneity and establish a causal inference.

Findings

The difference-in-difference tests suggest lower shareholder litigation risk intensifies REM. In other words, higher litigation risk mitigates REM. Cross-sectional test results suggest the negative effect of decreased shareholder litigation is more pronounced when monitoring difficulty is higher, when information environment is more impoverished and when internal corporate governance is weaker. The negative effect is also stronger in firms with higher sensitivity to legal threats.

Originality/value

Protection of investors’ interest is the focus of corporate governance. Designed as an important corporate governance mechanism, shareholder litigation enables investors to pursue legal actions to recover their losses in the event of corporate misbehaviors. However, whether shareholder litigation is an effective corporate governance tool and beneficial to shareholders and firms is not without controversy. The authors contribute to the debate by providing evidence that supports the argument that shareholder litigation threat significantly disciplines REM, a form of costlier earnings management technique and myopic investment behavior.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

This paper has benefited from the comments of participants at the 2017 American Accounting Association Annual Conference in San Diego. The original title was “External corporate governance and real activities management: evidence from private enforcement”.

Citation

Liao, Q. and Ouyang, B. (2019), "Shareholder litigation risk and real earnings management: a causal inference", Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 557-588. https://doi.org/10.1108/RAF-06-2018-0122

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2019, Emerald Publishing Limited

Related articles