Seminar on a maritime accident: Mineral Dampier

Disaster Prevention and Management

ISSN: 0965-3562

Article publication date: 1 March 1999

222

Citation

Levinson, D.J. (1999), "Seminar on a maritime accident: Mineral Dampier", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 8 No. 1. https://doi.org/10.1108/dpm.1999.07308aac.001

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 1999, MCB UP Limited


Seminar on a maritime accident: Mineral Dampier

Seminar on a maritime accident: Mineral Dampier

Haifa, 7 January 1997

On 7 January 1997 the Israel Administration of Shipping & Ports (Ministry of Transportation) and the Israel Police held a seminar to discuss aspects of the response to the sinking of the Mineral Dampier at 0330 hours on 22 June 1995 in the East Yellow Sea, 500 kilometers off the coast of Japan. Twenty-seven crew members, amongst them nine Israelis including the captain, lost their lives.

After introductory remarks, the first speaker, Dr Danny Livneh, a maritime engineer, described events at the time of the accident which preceeded the sinking. The Mineral Dampier was at a weight of 195,000 metric tons with a cargo of metals. It collided at full speed with a Korean ship listed with a weight of 151,000 tons including cargo. The Mineral Dampier broke into two pieces and sank. Although initial press reports described the sinking as within two minutes, later investigation suggested sinking at 15 to 30 minutes after the collision. Numerous questions arose after the incident. Some people on the bridge were eventually found wearing safety vests, but there was apparently no order to abandon ship. Life boats were also never lowered. The ship's communication equipment was inspected and certified three months earlier; for an unknown reason it was not used. Although the ship had been hit in the rear, the break which caused sinking was in the center. The speaker surmised that the severity of the situation was not realized, and that it was thought that the vessel would make it to port as did the Korean ship with relatively minor damage. The explanation was that although damage initiated in the rear section of the ship, it spread in areas not visible from the bridge and deck, causing a breaking in the center and only then almost immediate sinking given the weight of the cargo. Within two days of the accident the vessel was located at a depth of 80 meters; it was estimated that in the first two weeks after the accident, the ship sank a further seven meters into the seabed. One interesting phenomenon was the release in the area of the ship of a "cloud" of metallic powder from the cargo; this remained for at least 18 months, killing all fish in the vicinity. This meant that there was no body damage from fish when corpses were eventually recovered. In another development, the nearest coast was Japan, and the Japanese were extremely helpful in everything relating to locating the wreckage and the search for survivors. Japanese law, however, prevents the entry into the country of deceased non-citizens, hence victim identification and body repatriation operations were moved to South Korea.

Dr Y. Shafir, representing a private company specializing in maritime search, made the next presentation. He related that at 1630 hours on 25 June 1995 his company received authorization by the Government of Israel to begin search operations for the sunken ship with the aim of arriving at the vessel and retrieving the bodies of the deceased. (This operation, which would ultimately cost more than five million dollars, was a concrete expression of the importance attached by Israel to bringing the dead to formal burial.) A team was immediately dispatched to Japan. Based on available information, a search area was designated and a ship equipped with DGPS and echo sounding was dispatched. Eleven days after authorization was received to search, the wreckage of the Mineral Dampier was located; seven days thereafter the first dive was made. Although there were numerous Israeli volunteers for the purpose, it was decided that their experience and equipment were inappropriate. The first divers were, in fact, found in Singapore. The boat for the operation was also not simple; finally, a vessel with four anchors was chosen, so that it would remain stationary while the divers were below. Problems ensued. Owing to decompression, a seven hour dive yielded only one hour of work at the site of the sunken boat. Experience quickly showed that the hour was best timed to start at 0430, when the four to five knot water stream was at its lowest speed. Unexpectedly cold water temperatures at sea bed meant the need for further special equipment. From other sinkings it was known that the initial entrance to the bridge is a traumatic event, so divers were given psychological briefings to prepare them. Thought was given to the possibility of a diver vomiting into his mask at the sight of cadavers floating in the sunken wreckage, but this did not occur; if it had, the result would have been almost certain death from choking. Divers generally like an unobstructed path above them to the water's surface, hence entering into the small openings provided by the bent metal of a wreck can be a problem, further complicated by very limited lighting. One particular diver of small build was not bothered by entering the ship, and he found most of the bodies. After 41 dives, it was decided to change methods in the next phase of the operation which, for reasons of both planning and weather, was about a year later. This time divers were kept at sea bed compression for extended amounts of time and lowered into the waters in a sealed diving bell; this resulted in more working time. It was also decided to remove some debris from the wreckage, hoping to find more bodies. In the end a total of 18 cadavers were found in the two stages of the operation; many of these victims were not found in the places expected, hence stressing the conclusion that the entire boat had to be searched. When certain bodies were touched by divers, they began to crumble and parts had to be caught before they floated away; thus, photography before touching, if at all possible, was done. Divers complained that from the little amounts which penetrated the masks, "the waters smell." This was only a small hint of the stench aboard the awaiting ship when bodies were brought to the surface and hoisted aboard ship. The bodies were then placed in refrigerated containers for shipment to Pusan, South Korea.

Dr Satinger of Rambam Hospital, Haifa described some of the principles of maritime medicine, then Commander Elie Shmeltzer of the Israel Police described how the Israel Police handles victim identification abroad. Most cases tend to be in developing countries. Before a team is sent, it is best to have a clear definition of the mission so that appropriate personnel and materials can be sent. A minimal team consists of four people including a manager assisted by technicians for photography, odontology and fingerprints. The state of the bodies can influence who should be sent. In the Comoro Islands incident (11/96), considerably more medical staff than DVI was sent by Israel; in retrospect the decision should have been more DVI. The job of a team abroad is to assist local authorities and not to take over responsibility from them, particularly since visiting teams usually have no real legal status. In the case of Israel a major consideration in DVI is assuring that identifications meet the requirements of Jewish Law. In a closing note the speaker noted that in the 22 incidents in which Israel was involved, both at home and abroad, cellular telephones were an important element in communications and cutting bureaucratic red tape.

Chief Inspector Tzippy Kahana, a forensic anthropologist assigned by the Israel Police to the Institute for Forensic Medicine in Tel Aviv/Yafo, described her experience with the Mineral Dampier. When she received the bodies in Pusan, South Korea, it took some 12 hours for them to thaw. Although some bodies were identified by visual recognition, it is the policy of the Israel Police to verify all identifications by other means. Property is only considered circumstantial evidence. In the case of the Mineral Dampier body identifications of the Israelis were as follows:

  • dental and fingerprints;

  • dental and fingerprints;

  • fingerprints;

  • dental;

  • dental;

  • features shown in x-ray of chest.

The bodies of three other Israelis were not recovered.

Dr Jay Levinson, a superintendent with the Israel Police and Chairman of the Interpol DVI Standing Committee, explained that there are no binding international agreements covering DVI. Although in aviation accidents, for example, ICAO Annex XIII gives countries whose citizens are involved in a disaster, the right to be involved in identification, this is a recommendation and not a binding requirement. To assist in DVI the Interpol Committee has developed a series of forms and a manual delineating recommended procedures. The forms were used successfully with the victims of the Mineral Dampier. In October 1997 the Interpol General Assembly passed a new resolution giving the Standing Committee a much wider mandate than in the past, now giving members a role in practical assistance. Interpol member countries are now requested to co-operate with foreign DVI teams and admit them to the country of the accident.

Dr Maya Freund of the Institute for Forensic Medicine in TelAviv/Yafo is a biologist with special expertise in DNA. She noted that in the case of the Mineral Dampier, the intestines of one victim were recovered and refrigerated on a Friday. Two days later the refrigerator was opened, only to find very advanced decomposition. In such cases it is best to freeze, not refrigerate. When DNA is used as a tool in identification, it is because other methods such as fingerprints are unavailable. Another use of DNA is to associate body parts for the purpose of burial. In the case of the Mineral Dampier it was thought that the salt water might destroy the DNA in the bodies recovered. This proved not to be the case. For one victim DNA samples were taken from three Israeli families. This was done by a representative of the Institute rather than by a regular physician to avoid contamination of the samples and to avoid any possible legal or court problems. Negative results showed that the body did not belong to any of the three Israeli families.

Mr Vosi Hazan of the Israel, Administration of Shipping and Ports summed up the seminar by stating most candidly that at the onset of the DVI operation he had no idea how complicated it was destined to be.

Dr Jay Levinson

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