On Adam Smith and Confucius: The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Analects

Citation

Wong, B. (2001), "On Adam Smith and Confucius: The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Analects", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 28 No. 4, pp. 380-391. https://doi.org/10.1108/ijse.2001.28.4.380.2

The ostensible intention of this book is to compare Adam Smith and Confucius “in order to understand whether or not Westernization of the Confucian regions is sustainable and whether or not there will be “clashes of civilizations” between the Confucian regions and the West” (Preface). According to the author, Adam Smith is “the most influential thinker in developed economies in modern times.” Confucius, on the other hand, “was the most influential thinker in the Confucian regions” (Preface). The author, however, does not substantiate these claims about the two thinkers. Nor does he go on to tell us in the rest of the book whether or not the Westernization of the Confucian regions (China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, North and South Korea, Vietnam, Singapore) is sustainable.

The author twice mentions that in the last 150 years “China has made fun of Confucius” and the rest of the world “has made fun of China during the same period of time” (Preface and p. 113). He claims that the economic success of the so‐called Confucian regions reveals that it was a grave mistake for China to have made fun of Confucius. This is perhaps the main thesis of the work. But in order to prove that Confucius’ ideas contributed to the economic success of the Confucian regions, the author needs to show that classical Confucianism is not incompatible with capitalistic practices that have their apparent roots in the West, particularly in the moral and economic ideas of Adam Smith.

I have said that capitalism is apparently rooted in the West only because the author seems to suggest otherwise. In chapter one, the author devotes one section each to Leibniz, the German philosopher, and to Quesnay, the French economist. If the speculations of the author are right then both thinkers were ardent Confucians who effectively influenced the course of development of the European Enlightenment (see pp. 24‐30). So by the time Smith came into contact with (and presumably fell under the influence of) Quesnay, “Confucianism… had been already absorbed into Western philosophers’ rational systems” (p. 29). It is perhaps the author’s implied understanding that the reason why classical Confucianism is compatible with Western capitalism is because the latter was based in large part on the former. This would be both an exciting and a revolutionary thesis if the author provided substantial rather than circumstantial and at times questionable evidence to support his case.

The author is no less questionable in his treatment of Confucius and his ideas. He claims, for example, that the I Ching or Book of Changes is essential for appreciating Confucius’ mode of thought. But the author is unable to cite specific passages in the Analects to support this claim (see pp. 20‐22). One more example should suffice to demonstrate the author’s characteristic approach to classical Confucianism. Consider the following passage regarding the claim that Confucius taught that humans possess free will and individuality:

The gentleman’s mind has its own end and is not a social machine operated by some one else. Each man is free; and each social man is subjected to Confucius’ following reciprocal requirement: In youth, not humble as befits a junior; in manhood, doing nothing worthy of being handed down; and living on to old age: this is to be a pest. This “trading principle” may explain why there are so few beggars in streets in the industrialized Confucian regions (p. 37).

The unfortunate consequence of the author’s rationalization of Confucius and his teachings is that he ends up degrading the Master himself. In the attempt to enlist Confucius in the service of respectable moneymakers, the author says: “Confucius himself was concerned with wealth and honour. He had to earn his family’s living by work. It does not seem that he lacked money and reputation in his lifetime” (p. 91). Just because Confucius had no wish to starve himself and his family does not mean that he was concerned with wealth. Besides, most sensible readers of the Analects would have noted how Confucius tried to overcome or at least to moderate the desire for wealth among his disciples. Confucius characterized his favourite disciple, Yen Yuan, as one who “always allows himself constantly to be in dire poverty” (Analects 11.19). And as far as reputation is concerned, Confucius was known in his time as one who was fighting for a lost cause. To date, no successful Asian entrepreneur has acquired such a reputation.

Readers unfamiliar with the Analects and other classical Chinese texts cited in the book would have an exceedingly difficult time verifying the quotes, as they are not referenced at all. Some passages from the classical texts, and the Analects in particular, are cited out of context; and in at least one instance three separate quotes appear together, as if they were from a single passage (in fact one of the three quotes is not even in the Analects (see p. 91 bottom). In addition, the author makes constant references to the sayings of the Taoist philosopher, Lao Tzu. The latter is associated with Confucius in the author’s eyes because he is said to favour minimum government intervention in the economy. This is partially true. But Lao Tzu teaches a kind of anarchism that is ultimately hostile to capitalism and technology.

There are, to be sure, some interesting and plausible accounts of Confucius’ moral teachings in the book; for example, the discussion of the gentleman and the small‐minded individual is quite promising (pp. 41‐4). But whatever merits there are in the book, they are overshadowed by its many deficiencies.