Cyber war will not take place

Citation

Sainato, V.A. (2013), "Cyber war will not take place", Policing: An International Journal, Vol. 36 No. 2. https://doi.org/10.1108/pijpsm.2013.18136baa.005

Cyber war will not take place

Cyber war will not take place

Article Type: Perspectives on policing From: Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, Volume 36, Issue 2.

Thomas RidJournal of Strategic Studies2012Vol. 35No. 1pp. 5-32

This paper argues that that despite a consensus among policy planners, academics, commentators, and other interested parties (i.e. military) to the contrary that a “cyber war” will not occur. The author presents a three-pronged argument. First he defines what he means by “cyber war” which he derives from Clausewitz definition of war; second, he illustrates, through examples, what “cyber war” is not; lastly, he concludes that arguing that cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of sabotage, espionage, and subversion.

This paper is, in large measure, conceptual. The author argues through analogy that the definition for cyber war is “a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code.” Importantly, all three of these precursors to the force must be present. Core to the authors understanding is the direct application of violence with regard to cause and effect. The purpose of an F-16, a cruise missile, an IED, or even a suicide bomber in a public square is not ambiguous. There is an explicit intention of lethality – a “trigger” of some kind is initiated and the effect is some kind of violence. He argues that in cyber war the causes and effects are mediated through a complex series of steps that could be violent. Thus, he holds out the possibility through a string of hypothetical scenarios that even if the means (i.e. computer code) is not inherently dangerous its effects (i.e. crashing the air traffic control grid and shutting it down) can be lethal. But, and this is what his pivotal to his paper, he argues that the prospect of a true cyber war occurring is science fiction.

To date, the author argues that there is have be no true act of cyber war. He then analyzes what many commentators believe are the first cases of cyber war – a Russian pipeline explosion in 1982, an attack causing a wide-spread shutdown of government and bank computers in Estonia (2007), and a similar one in Georgia (2008) that was coordinated with a ground war. The Russian pipeline story, he argues, is a myth. In fact, the CIA attempted to place software in the Russian oil pipeline management system but that it was not successful. With regard to Estonia there was no lethality involved; merely, a tremendous amount of inconvenience. Lastly, the Georgian case was about disrupting communications within the government to facilitate an actual ground offensive.

Through these examples and a few others he demonstrates that that which has been argued to be cyber war, in the past, has really been misunderstood as some variation of sabotage, espionage, and/or subversion. And this is where his paper concludes. With an argument that heretofore and in the future these cyber war-like acts are really not acts of war, per se.

The key to understanding the value of this paper is as follows. On one hand, call it what you will, but when these bad acts occur terrible damage is inflicted – including the possibility of loss of life or other harms. Moreover, the nature of these harms is not always simple inconveniences and the effects can be long lasting, even permanent. But, this paper is not a mere rhetorical exercise. International law as it pertains to war is complicated; however, the Geneva Convention(s) do not consider saboteurs to be making lawful war. Thus, there is a sophisticated legal argument regarding whether or not a state can declare war on another state in response to the cyber-based events that have or, according to the author, most likely to occur.

Vincenzo A. SainatoLoyola University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA, USA