Managerial Finance: Volume 19 Issue 6

Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Reputation: A Synthesis

Associate John Dobson

This paper investigates the extent to which the agency problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are ameliorated by agents' desire to build and maintain reputations in a…

Bank CEO Salaries: The Relation Between Performance, Ownership Concentration, and CEO Tenure

Vadhindran K. Rao, James E. McIntyre

We examine whether Douglas and Santerre's (1990) substitutes hypothesis obtains for bank holding companies (BHCs); i.e. whether degree of ownership concentration and salary…

Investment Returns of Life Insurers: Tests of Agency Theory and its Alternatives

Mary Ann Boose

Agency theory leads to proposals that managers of asset portfolios would not necessarily maximize net return on invested assets for any level of risk. Because investment income…

Three Agency‐Cost Reasons for Hedging Foreign Exchange Risk

John Dobson, Luc Soenen

Given that it is costly, the widespread use of foreign exchange hedging is puzzling for several reasons. In an efficient market exchange rate fluctuations should even out over…

A Note on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, An Agency Perspective

Uric B. Dufrene

Significant attention has been devoted to agency theory in the financial literature. Dating back to the seminal contribution of Jensen and Meckling (1976), financial economists…

Conflicts of Interest and Measurement Issues and Their Effects on Reporting of Environmental Liabilities

Douglas C. Cerf

There are many decisions for which management must consider the broad interests of society at large (all stakeholders) in addition to the interests of the stockholders. One such…