Review of the Handbook of Rational and Social Choice

Citation

Lane, J. (2011), "Review of the Handbook of Rational and Social Choice", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 38 No. 7, pp. 662-663. https://doi.org/10.1108/03068291111139276

In the flood of handbooks that publishers now pour out, reflecting changing market condition for publishing given the increase in photocopying and scanning, time has come to two respectable areas of social science research, namely individual choice under uncertainty and social choice. A number of articles in each part present the state of the art today, which makes this handbook very useful in advanced teaching and research.

Part I examines the rational choice model of individual behaviour, offering both alternative versions of this model and discussions of key topics in the application of the model such as the well‐known paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg. This section is highly coherent with presentations of expected utility theory and the non‐expected utility model. For any teacher presenting rational choice to students in economics and the social sciences, it is a most valuable source book.

First, expected utility theory is presented (Grant and van Zandt), and then non‐expected utility theory (Abdellaqui, Bleichrodt and Schmidt). The first is more parsimonious than the latter but it generates the classical individual choice paradoxes, much discussed in this volume. The latter accounts for these paradoxes but it allows for ambiguity (Eichberger and Kelsey) as well as the abandoning of the principles of independence (McClennen) and transitivity (Anand). The rational choice model of individual decision making is applied in explorations of foolishness (Hajek) and diversity (Nehring and Puppe) as well as future outcomes (Manzini and Mariotti).

Theories of individual choice under uncertainty satisfy the Popper criterion of falsifiability. Thus, they may be tested against information about real decision making (Read), and developed to take into account dynamic aspects like learning (Alos‐Ferrer and Schlag). Experimental data suggest that the classical model is too simplistic, being in need of revision without making the theory too complicated.

Matters are entirely different with regard to Part II of this volume, which is basically about normativity, especially justice in distributive economics. Although one may enquire into how people react to different principles of justice (Gaertner), there could never be a basic rejection of a justice theory in the Popperian sense. If people do not endorse justice as Rawlsian maxim, they could simple have failed to understand the logic of the veil of ignorance (Peter), just as the adherents of, e.g. Apartheid erred.

Part II gives a broad overview of the themes within social choice or group choice, ranging from topics in welfare economics to problems in moral philosophy. This section is less coherent, reflecting the diversity of themes in social choice, from Arrowian type social welfare functions (List and Puppe) over utilitarianism (Pattanaik, Suzumura and Xu) to population ethics (Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson). How difficult it is to ground equality as the fundamental principle of distributive justice recurs in several contributions (Fleurbaey, Tungooden and Schokkaert).

To sum up, this is an excellent handbook for advanced researchers and students.