Audit quality attributes of European Union supreme audit institutions
Abstract
Purpose
To examine the enabling legislation of European Union (EU) member country supreme audit institutions (SAIs) for their accountability to parliament and independence from the executive arm of government.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample comprises the SAIs of the 25 EU member countries and the European Court of Auditors. Data were collected on 30 accountability and independence issues directly from the enabling legislation of these SAIs.
Findings
Results indicate that apart from a number of instances where the enabling legislation is silent, provisions generally provide for adequate independence of the SAIs from the executive arm of government. On the other hand, the provisions for the accountability of the SAIs to parliament are somewhat weaker.
Research limitations/implications
If actual practice or convention does not reflect the literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation, then SAIs may have more or less independence and/or accountability than suggested by the analysis of the legislation alone.
Practical implications
Results of this study highlight where current provisions could be further strengthened through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation.
Originality/value
Such findings may be useful to policy makers and legislators.
Keywords
Citation
Clark, C., De Martinis, M. and Krambia‐Kapardis, M. (2007), "Audit quality attributes of European Union supreme audit institutions", European Business Review, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 40-71. https://doi.org/10.1108/09555340710714144
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2007, Emerald Group Publishing Limited