Governance and organisational controls in public and private banks

Abstract

Managers of a sample of private and public banks in Greece were surveyed through the vehicle of agency theory. It was found that managers in private banks showed greater alignment of interests with those of the bank, their pay related to outcomes and they were more mobile in their jobs. Private banks also used more control mechanisms to align interests of their managers with those of the bank and displayed a different working climate. Given evolving organisation structures resulting from deregulation, the convergence of information technology and communications and the entry of firms from other industries, the implications of the findings for governance are important.

Citation

Kangis, P. and Kareklis, P. (2001), "Governance and organisational controls in public and private banks", Corporate Governance, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 31-38. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700110389601