Power in the boardroom: a study on Turkish family‐owned and listed companies

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to understand the power dynamics of the boards of directors in family‐owned and listed Turkish companies. Power and dominance in the boardroom can be studied in relation to three variables: the institutional environment in which the firm is embedded; the structural configurations of the board; and the top manager's propensity to exercise his/her power resources. Focusing on the board level, this paper aims to conceptualize power dynamics as being composed of structural attributes, roles assumed, responsibilities, dependency and representation.

Design/methodology/approach

The research domain of this exploratory study is family‐owned and listed companies operating on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). The data for the study were collected from three different sources: a survey administered to members of the boards of directors; discourse analysis of corporate governance compliance reports of the same companies; and in‐depth interviews conducted with board members.

Findings

This study shows that on a typical board of directors of a family‐owned and listed Turkish company, the interests of owners and managers are aligned and other stakeholders are not represented; the role of the board is confined to visibility and legitimacy and does not include control.

Originality/value

This paper argues that theories developed for Anglo‐Saxon equity‐market based business systems have limited exploratory power for an emerging economy – namely Turkey – that is based on a business system characterized by close co‐operation between the state, family‐owned businesses and financial markets.

Citation

Oba, B., Ozsoy, Z. and Atakan, S. (2010), "Power in the boardroom: a study on Turkish family‐owned and listed companies", Corporate Governance, Vol. 10 No. 5, pp. 603-616. https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701011085571