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Endogenous evolution of patriarchal clan system in ancient China

Feng Deng (National Research Center for Upper Yangtze Economy, School of Tourism and Land Resource, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing, China)

International Journal of Social Economics

ISSN: 0306-8293

Article publication date: 9 October 2017

502

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to analyze long-term institutional causes and consequences of preference falsification by studying the evolution of China’s patriarchal clan system.

Design/methodology/approach

The historic study shows that although the clan system was abolished in the Qin dynasty, it re-emerged among high-standing families in the Han dynasty and spread to common people after the Tang dynasty.

Findings

The author submits that the clan system was an institutional response to the preference falsification problem that arose due to the dictatorial political institutions first established in the Qin dynasty. It helped people to take collective action by themselves and also opened a back door to influence government decisions. A piece of clear evidence is the co-evolution of the clan system and government personnel system.

Social implications

In this sense, the clan system probably also helped to prolong the political institutions for 2,000 years.

Originality/value

This is the first institutional study on the clan system in China.

Keywords

Citation

Deng, F. (2017), "Endogenous evolution of patriarchal clan system in ancient China", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 44 No. 10, pp. 1322-1334. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJSE-12-2015-0330

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2017, Emerald Publishing Limited

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