Some Implications of a Pragmatist Conception of the Aims of Economic Enquiry

Abstract

In recent years, in keeping with the new emphasis on science as a human activity, a process of inquiry, philosophers of science have begun to pay more attention to the criteria for choosing between competing hypotheses or theories. There is now a widespread tendency to treat the standard criteria of theory appraisal, such as a theory's accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, elegance, etc., not as rules which dictate choice but as values, maxims, norms which influence scientific decision making (Kuhn, 1977). In opposition to those seeking an algorithm of theory choice it is now recognised that there are, inevitably, certain subjective elements in scientific theory appraisal. The standard criteria, while providing the shared basis for choice, not only are imprecise in their meaning and application but, when deployed together, often conflict with one another as, for example, when one theory is more accurate but less simple than another. Thus two scientists fully committed to the same set of standards may, if they interpret these standards differently, or if they attach different weights to different desiderata, reach different conclusions as to the merits of competing theoretical constructs.

Citation

Dwyer, L. (1987), "Some Implications of a Pragmatist Conception of the Aims of Economic Enquiry", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 14 No. 6, pp. 22-35. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb014063