Finland's EU presidency: 1 July 1999-January 2000

Citation

Erickson, J. (1999), "Finland's EU presidency: 1 July 1999-January 2000", European Business Review, Vol. 99 No. 6. https://doi.org/10.1108/ebr.1999.05499fab.003

Finland's EU presidency: 1 July 1999-January 2000

John Erickson

John Erickson is Honorary Fellow in Defence Studies and Professor Emeritus at the University of Edinburgh

Keywords European Union, Finland, Eastern Europe, Armed forces, NATO

For a relative newcomer to the European Union, its membership only dating back to 1995, Finland has made striking progress in moving from the periphery of European politics to the centre of the European stage. From the outset Finland closely identified itself with European policies, in particular economic and monetary union, in contrast to its more Euro-sceptic Nordic fellow EU members. Thanks to economic policies encouraging recovery and prudent management Finland was among the first to conform to the Maastricht criteria and declared itself a firm proponent of the single currency, becoming a founder member of the Euro. Step by step Finland advanced into Europe, moving to the board of the European Central Bank, latterly assuming the first-ever Finnish Presidency of the EU on 1 July 1999.

This has been accomplished against the background of the critical geostrategic position occupied by Finland, straddling as it does the fault line between West and East. Ever closer relations with Brussels have not intruded upon strengthening economic ties and trade associations with Russia, Finland's giant neighbour to the east; indeed this is deliberately intended as a complementary process to extend mutual benefits. It is also this combination of calculation and wariness which has so far persuaded Finland to forgo formal membership of NATO (though some espy close affinity with it), to maintain neutrality which, however, does not preclude a form of defence association with the West through the agency of Western European Union (WEU), accommodating those not militarily aligned in Europe.

On the eve of the Finnish Presidency, on 17 June, Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen set out the Finnish agenda, first reviewing the state of the EU itself. The implementation of EMU and the Treaty of Amsterdam boded well for stability and effectiveness, but the sudden resignation of the Commission created "uncertainty". Relations between the Union and its citizens and Union structures merited "serious reappraisal". Instruments for crisis management must be developed, but settlement of the Kosovo crisis, shaping the future of south-eastern Europe, pose the "greatest challenge for Finland's Presidency", expectations heightened by the role of the President of Finland in the Kosovo peace process.

EU enlargement is necessary to ensure Europe's stability and prosperity, but that will require reform within the Union, "institutional adaptation" considered by an Intergovernmental Conference covering the composition of the Commission, the weighting of votes in the Council and increased decision making by qualified majority. What Finland aims to achieve is a strengthening of the image of the EU as "an open, effective and responsible actor", to which end there must be increased transparency in institutions, appropriate use of funds properly supervised. What also Finland seeks through its Presidency is "a comprehensive and consistent policy" with respect to external relations, the opportunity for which is presented by the Treaty of Amsterdam and, not least, the Common Strategy on Russia so recently approved by the European Council gathering in Cologne. Definition of the "common interests" of the EU is the intended goal.

Enlargement figures prominently, indeed largely predominates in the Finnish agenda. This preoccupation reflects the singularity of Finland's geographic and geopolitical situation. Both EU enlargement and that of NATO constitute Finland's problem and simultaneously Finland's opportunity, a duality which oscillates between Moscow and Brussels. Should NATO's eastward expansion unduly antagonise Russia, then the cost for Finland could be high, given a common border. Publicly shying away from NATO, associating rather with WEU, exemplified Finnish intentions to minimise Russia's potential frights, while Finnish strategy utilising the several northern regional agencies, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council for example, aimed to draw Russia more closely into these developments and thus into a closer association with the EU.

Enter the "Northern Dimension", at first sight an evocative term, in reality nothing less than a Finnish strategic plan to implement long-term cooperation between Russia, the Baltic sea basin and the Nordic states, its origin the Finnish-Russian bilateral treaty of 1992. It is also a concept which recognises the growing interdependence between the EU and Russia. Taking only energy, within the first two decades of the next century Europe will be importing almost all of its oil and 70 per cent of its natural gas, of which Russia has its main hydrocarbon deposits north of the Arctic Circle. Finland already had in mind the possibility of a Russian gas pipeline to southern Europe, a gas link to Finland itself, a roadway link between Helsinki and Moscow, cooperation on nuclear safety.

In his address to the Conference of Chairpersons of the Foreign Affairs Committees on 21 July 1999, Prime Minister Lipponen set the "Northern Dimension", hitherto a "missing concept", in its European context. It is, he remarked, to be regarded as "an instrument in the European integration process" and simultaneously a support of the EU enlargement process. This project reinforces "positive interdependence between the European Union, Russia and other states in the Baltic region". Similarly, it sustains the enlargement process, helping to "integrate Russia into European and international structures". Additionally it will create conditions for EU enlargement in the Baltic Sea region and the eventual normalisation of Baltic-Russian relations.

Disclaiming any undue Finnish interest in or favour towards the "Northern Dimension", Prime Minister Lipponen pointed out that it is not a "unique invention", being but one of several such "dimensions" within the EU, the "Southern Dimension", a "Western Dimension", a Mediterranean policy, a Transatlantic Agenda. Nevertheless the "Northern Dimension" has perforce a specific geographical focus, involving countries bordering the Baltic Sea, the regions of north-west Russia and Kaliningrad.

What Prime Minister Lipponen chooses to emphasise is that northern and southern "dimensions" are mutually supportive. Stability on the northern borders reinforces the EU in the south. In the south-east, the EU prepares a common strategy on Ukraine and the western Balkans and the same comprehensive strategy for the Mediterranean region. Specifically the "Northern Dimension" concept promotes co-operation with the countries of Europe's northern regions in order to strengthen security and counter dangers presented by environmental pollution, nuclear hazards and cross-border crime. What this means in practice is, without creating new financial instruments or institutions, concentrating on infrastructure, (transport, energy, telecommunication), environmental protection and nuclear safety, education, public health, cross-border co-operation, trade, investment, anti-crime measures.

An example of what could be involved, indeed, is presently involved in the effort to "strengthen the dialogue between the EU and Russia", was the two-day seminar on EU-Russia Judicial Cooperation held in Lappeenranta in July. This gathering, attended by a 20-strong Russian delegation, according to the Finnish Minister of Justice, demonstrated that Russia despite all the prevailing difficulties is prepared to increase its investment in judicial cooperation. The aim of the seminar was the promotion of practical cooperation between the EU and the judicial authorities of member states and Russia in cross-border criminal and civil cases. Lappeenranta was also the scene of a seminar on EU-Russia migration, part of the Finnish Presidency's agenda in pursuit of the Common Strategy on Russia earlier adopted by the European Council in Cologne.

In the Finnish view, Kosovo has "by no means" reduced the relevance of policies strengthening stability in the north. If anything the urgency of involving Russia with her neighbours has intensified, increasing the political relevance of the Northern Dimension, placing it high on the agenda of the July meeting between Mr Lipponen and Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin in Moscow. But there is no escape for the Finnish Presidency from the immediacy of the Kosovo crisis, the settlement, restoration of stability in the Balkans, the future of south-eastern Europe, amounting to the "greatest challenge" to the Presidency, made the more daunting and demanding by the reflected glory of President of Finland Marrti Ahtisaari's major role in the Kosovo peace process. In a mid-July interview, President Ahtisaari warned against the "short-sightedness" which concentrated on Mr Milosevic alone, arguing for less impatience and for common sense to prevail.

What the Kosovo crisis has impressed upon the Finnish Presidency is the need to improve "the Union's capacity to react rapidly to crises and to find appropriate ways for cooperation". Following the conclusions of the Cologne European Council, the Finnish Presidency has embarked on plans to develop both non-military and military crisis management, two "separate but concurrent projects", shifting the emphasis from what has been primarily military crisis management in the direction of "non-military cooperation". What is common to both modes, military and non-military, is the need for early warning systems. The thrust of the Finnish position is the need for an integrated civilian and military approach to the problem of conflict prevention, where setting up a new Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit is viewed as an important innovation.

Finland's interest in developing a capability for crisis management within the EU is not new. Proposing practical steps towards more effective European defence cooperation without engaging major constitutional changes dates back to the 1997 Amsterdam summit and a Finnish-Swedish initiative. In no sense did this envisage a European army, rather a small, rapid reaction force, complementing but not deferring to NATO, whose responsibility would remain the collective defence of its members. The utility of such a force, mandated by the UN or OSCE, would be demonstrated in situations where the USA was unwilling or unprepared to commit ground troops. Given the kaleidoscope of institutional affiliations and the disparities in membership of the EU, WEU and NATO, the committed, the neutrals and the militarily non-aligned (Austria, Finland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden) the Finnish proposal was designed to facilitate equitable participation of assorted nations. Presently it is incumbent on the Finnish Presidency to develop the common European security and defence identity proposed by "some of the big Member States", to which the Finns add, recalling their earlier initiative, that all 15 EU members participate, including the neutrals and the non-aligned, the small on equal terms with the big.

These are huge items for a huge agenda, fitting the unique commission of ushering the EU into the new millennium. While advancing the cause of the "Northern Dimension", the Finnish Presidency has demonstrably taken the cause of the "European Dimension" to heart, Europe's strategic status, security policy, social priorities, in a word, defining more closely what vision of Europe is contemplated and what fundamental purpose is served, not least as Europe's geopolitical and geoeconomic configuration changes. The Finnish Presidency coincides not only with EU enlargement and NATO expansion but also with the transformation of both institutions. Whatever the outcome, the Finnish Presidency evidently aims to ensure that this should not be a Europe unmindful of a vital relationship with Russia, nor one that is disinclined to be globally active and influential.

Enlargement and integration - these appear as the key words in the many pronouncements made by or on behalf of the Finnish Presidency, a twin-track approach to the development of the European Union. Of the two, enlargement remains the "single most important goal for the Union at the beginning of a the new millennium". As for economic and political integration, this must have a complement in developing similar arrangements for security and defence. While these are all expressions of high political purpose and evolving strategy in a European Union set on its post-Kosovo course, the ordinary EU citizen can expect greater transparency, probity and accessibility in the running of the system, which has hitherto seemed either remote or irrelevant. The lesson of Europeans voting with their feet has not gone unremarked, reinforcing the urgency of working for a "better functioning, efficient and transparent European Union".

It is too early to speak of the specific achievements of the Finnish Presidency, though introduction of policies for a Northern Dimension is hailed as a political breakthrough. That "most urgent, difficult and large-scale task", dealing with the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis, will take time and the patience recommended by President Ahtisaari, though a start has been made. The engine of EU enlargement has been revved up. In the end, however, what must count most in favour of the Finnish Presidency is being more explicit about the purpose of the Union, reforming its system and humanising its functions.