Corporate Governance: Volume 12 Issue 3

Information technology, an enabler in corporate governance

Sherly Elizabeth Abraham

The purpose of this paper is to understand how information technology can be utilized as a driver of incentives in the decision‐making process of corporate governance.

Corporate social responsibility and corporate governance in Malaysian government‐linked companies

Elinda Esa, Nazli Anum Mohd Ghazali

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there has been a change in the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and to determine whether corporate…

The sustainability of corporate governance – considerations for a model

Alan L. Jones, Clive H. Thompson

The purpose of this paper is to seek comment on a proposed new model for measuring and monitoring the sustainability of corporate governance.

Interlocks network structure as driving force of coopetition among Italian firms

Michele Simoni, Rosa Caiazza

The prevalent literature considers interlocking directorates as a mechanisms of cooperation among companies, but if the same director seats on the boards of two companies that are…

Investigating the phenomenon of earnings management in the Egyptian stock market

Hany Kamel, Said Elbanna

The aim of this paper is to investigate the phenomenon of earnings management in Egypt, with particular reference to the pricing of IPOs. In addition, it aims to discuss its…

Family ownership, board committees and firm performance: evidence from Hong Kong

Tin‐yan Lam, Shu‐kam Lee

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between board committees and firm performance and the moderating effect of family ownership for public companies in Hong Kong.

Fending knights or masked kings: toward a theoretical framework of interim CEO succession

Xin Liang, Yanxin Liu, Sibin Wu, Shujuan Zhang

There is no previous systematic and theoretical investigation of the interim CEO succession practice. This research attempts to fill the gap by studying this phenomenon and hence…

Outside director‐shareholder agency conflicts: evidence from bank consolidation

James Tompkins, Robert Hendershott

Takeovers create a potential conflict of interest between target shareholders and directors. While mergers generally create value for the target shareholders, their directors will…

Editorial

Andrew Kakabadse, Nada Kakabadse